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Abstract:
This paper considers a model with a sponsor and several bureaus to analyse the role of sharing rules.
Various incentives for budget overspending are identified among them the overspending of budgets
due to soft budget constraints. Four different sharing rules are also considered that differ with respect
to their strategic properties and whether the share is exogenous or endogenous. The results show that
sharing on the basis of egalitarian principles yields a lower budget deficit than sharing based upon
relative deficits both in symmetric and asymmetric  games.  The ranking of deficits that follow from
sharing based upon relative budgets and sharing that equalises ex-post debt ratios is shown to depend
on the properties of the health production function.3
1. INTRODUCTION
Public and private bureaus conduct decentralised spending while being centrally financed by a sponsor
that who repeatedly transfers a given amount of resources (budget-periods). The (planned) budget
reflects the sponsor’s willingness to pay for the services provided relative to costs, and budget
revisions occur over time in response to changes in sponsor priorities or costs. However, bureaus
themselves may also influence budgets (see e.g. Niskanen, 1971). Bureaus have information on costs
and returns that in principle can be truthfully reported in order to aid sponsors in defining optimal
budgets. Another possibility is to use sponsor-bureau information asymmetries strategically when
interests are conflicting (see e.g. Moene, 1986 and Chan and Mestelman, 1988). Bureaus may also
invest resources to influence decision makers (rent seeking and lobbying) to increase budgets. In this
paper the focus is one type of such an activity - the campaigning for extra funding by overspending
budgets.
Deviations between budgets (planned resource use) and actual resource use can be the result of
stochastic events outside the influence of the bureau, but also follow from insufficient management
control. In some cases, however, deficits seem to be pervasive phenomena that cannot be fully
understood by the above explanations. Rather, deficits arise because of moral hazard behaviour trying
to appropriate resources beyond those already allocated ex-ante in terms of a fixed budget. In this
perspective, the fundamental reason for budget deficits appears to be the bureau’s expectations that the
sponsor will bail-out. A sponsor’s inability to commit to (planned) budgets can follow from weak
political leadership induced by lacking majority control or ideological differences within ruling
coalitions. In the literature, soft budget constraints are discussed in relation to state-owned enterprises
(firms) and the banking sector (see e.g. Kornai, 1986). Dewatripoint and Maskin (1995) and Qian and
Roland (1998) attribute the occurrences of extra funds to the time-inconsistency problem. Sponsors
choose not to commit since bailing-out becomes preferable at later dates. In this perspective, soft
budget constraints becomes a policy for reaching a socially optimal outcome. Dalen et al., (2001), on
the other hand, assume that governments have private information on the consequences of sticking to
hard budget constraints. Here, a uniformed electorate is the reason for why governments choose not to
commit to fixed budgets.
Public health care, at least in Norway, appears to be a sector characterised by soft budget constraints.
Hospital budget deficits and subsequent sponsor bailouts are both pervasive and significant.
Magnussen (2000) reports that actual resource use for 18 Norwegian hospitals exceeded their global
budget by 4.5% (1997), 7% (1998) and 10% (1999)
1 in a three-year period. However, the
                                                
1 Applying information on initial budgets to estimate deficits is associated with both uncertainty and biases (see
Bjørnenak et al., (2000) for more on this issue). One example is that some expenses, being expected and already
agreed upon, are not necessarily parts of the initial budget e.g. real wage adjustments for hospital employees.4
remuneration system changed in 1997 from being one based upon block grants to partly activity based
financing. This reform may in itself have introduced sufficient uncertainty to cause such deficits.
However, other studies analysing the situation under the former remuneration system, also found
deficits to be frequent as well as significant. One example is Pettersen (1995) who presents data on
budgets and accounts for the Norwegian hospital sector for the period 1989-1991. From these data, the
global (national) deficit can be estimated by calculating the difference between total actual budgets
and total planned (initial) budgets relative to the planned (initial) budget; this yields the following
results; 7% (1989), 11.6% (1990) and 12,7% (1991).
2  An accounting study referred to in Carlsen
(1995), studying a single regional hospital (RiT
3), identified more than 2% overspending of hospital
department budgets in 45% of the cases during a 4-year period (1986-89).
       Table 1: Global budgets and actuals for 7 hospitals in the county of Nordland, Norway (1991-1997).
                       Million NOK
a (1997).    
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Initial (planned) budget (IB) 1095.5 1147.0 1167.3 1218.4 1183.3 1268.0 1278.7
Adjusted Budget (AB) 1193.9 1230.9 1267.5 1257.8 1314.6 1374.8 1398.2
Actual Budget (A) 1231.2 1268.8 1356.7 1349.8 1377.8 1421.2 1493.1
α   =    (A-IB)/IB 12.4% 10.6% 16.2% 10.8% 16.4% 12.1% 16.8%
β   =    (AB-IB)/(A-IB) 72.5% 68.8% 52.9% 30.0% 67.5% 69.7% 55.7%
       
a) NOK = Norwegian kroner. 1$ = 9 NOK (2001)
            Source: Pettersen (2000).
Supplementary grants from sponsors to Norwegian hospitals have also occurred. During the last two
years about 1.80 billion NOK (2001), 1.75 billion
4 NOK (2000) and 800 million NOK (1999) have
been provided by the central government to this sector.
5 More dis-aggregated data are scarce, however,
a study by Pettersen (2000) for a county (Nordland) with 7 hospitals do provide some information.
Here data on planned (initial) budgets, adjusted budgets and actual budgets are available for a 7-year
time period. From Table 1, a systematic gap is observed over time between planned (initial) and actual
budgets. If α  in Table 1 is interpreted as a proxy for the budget deficit as a share of the planned
(initial) budget it follows that deficits constitute from 10% to 17% of the planned budget with an
average of 13.6%. If β  is interpreted as the degree of bailing-out, it follows from Table 1 that the
degree of compensation for the 7 hospitals was between 30,3% to 72.5% with an average close to
60%. Carlsen (1995), analysing one regional hospitals (RiT) in the period 1987-1992, found budget
                                                
2 Data were collected by National Institute of Public Health (1992) and SINTEF NIS (1993).
3 Regionsykehuset i Trondheim
4 The central government first suggested additional funds for year 2000 amounting to 1,25 bill. NOK, however,
the parliament granted an additional 500 mill. NOK.
5 This figures follow from personal communication with the Ministry of Health.5
deficits as well as extra central government funding, which amounted annually to more than 100
million NOK.
There are several reasons for why supplementary grants are common in the Norwegian hospital sector.
First, health care is a large sector that produces an essential service; this makes it a major issue in
national politics. Second, potential health gains from investing additional resources in this sector can
more easily be linked to identifiable individuals than is the case for competing activities where gains
relate to statistical benefits (e.g. traffic safety measures). Third, health care is a sector very much
characterised by equality concerns, both socially and geographically, in that uniform services are to be
provided. Disruptions, in terms of sticking to hard budget constraints, may generate political costs in
terms of voter dissatisfaction. This is especially so in a situation where excess demand is easily
observed through media focus, but also because of former government commitments such as the
establishment of legal rights to treatment within a certain time period. A central government that
abstains from bailing out faces the risk of being considered unable to handle crucial welfare issues,
while those who do intervene appear strong.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the strategic incentives of bureaus when budget deficits
themselves are portrayed as appropriating activities. In particular, the focus is on the role of sharing
rules and whether the number of bureaus and bureau size asymmetry affect the various equilibria. The
institutional setting chosen in this analysis is one with multiple bureaus (hospitals) having a common
interest in aggregate extra funds from a single sponsor, while at the same time competing for shares. In
section 2 we present the model and derives symmetric equilibria outcomes for two different sharing
rules - sharing based upon relative deficits and egalitarian sharing – assuming Nash behaviour. In
section 3, the focus is on budget size asymmetry and the analysis is now restricted to two bureaus.
First, the two sharing rules already analysed in section 2 are considered, then two additional ones are
analysed – sharing based upon relative size and sharing that equalises ex-post debt-activity ratios.
Section 4 concludes.
2.  SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA FOR A MIXED SHARING RULE.
In the following we present a two-period model with multiple bureaus each receiving known transfers
from the sponsor. The budget deficit is the decision variable in the model and is assumed to reflect real
budget overspending in the sense that deficits are not the outcome of creative budgeting or accounting
manipulation (hidden savings). Furthermore, we do not consider possible devices sponsors may have
to penalize budget overspending such as investigations, auditing or managerial replacement as well as
moral costs that may go with bureau strategic behaviour.6
Consider a model where the bureau’s strictly concave production function in period j = 1,2 is as
follows;
( ) 1...... ; 1,2.
ii
jj HF R i nj == =         (1)
In the context of the hospital sector, 
i
j H can be interpreted as the health gains obtained for bureau i in
period j as function of resource spending, 
i
j R , in the same period. Thus, we have a single output
production function where resources are invested efficiently. Period 1 resources may come from two
different sources; i) the (planned) budget determined by the sponsor in this period, 
1
i b , and ii) by
overspending the (planned) budget, d, in the following denoted as the budget deficit. As in period 1 the
bureau receives a known and fixed budget in period 2, 
2
i b , however, since only two periods are
considered, having a deficit in period 2 is not possible and the deficit in period 1 must be covered by
the period 2 budget. Any debt service costs (interest payments and instalments) are ignored.
Consider now an exogenous number of bureaus, n, each being confronted with the following beliefs
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 ∑                            (2)
where D is the global (aggregate) deficits and 0≤  r ≤ 1 is the exogenous fraction of the global deficit
which is to be shared among the participating bureaus (the degree of liability).
6 It follows from (2) that
a deterministic and positive relationship is assumed between the size of the deficit for bureau i, 
i d ,
and sponsor compensation to bureau i, 
, im r s . The parenthesis in (2) defines a mixed sharing rule (mr)
where the magnitude of the parameter a determines the relative weight of the two sharing rules where
0≤   a≤ 1 .
7  For  0 a = each bureau receives 1/n of the global compensation, rD,  while for  1 a = each
bureau i receives a share equal to  /
i dD . Consequently, the mixed sharing presented in (2) is a
weighted average of an egalitarian principle (e) and sharing according to relative deficits (rd), where
the global compensation function is approximated by a linear function in global deficits. It follows
from our specification that we have a compensation function with public goods characteristics due to
the presence of rD in (2), while the sharing itself introduces negative externalities via the number of
                                                
6 A strictly concave global compensation function is not obvious since bailouts may respond to a “too big to
ignore” mechanism.
7 The mixed sharing rule is formerly applied in collective-group rent-seeking models (see e.g. Nitzan, 1991 and
Lee, 1995)7
bureaus, n, as well as the global deficit, D. Furthermore the model is not concerned with explaining
why governments bailout but assumes a non-strategic sponsor where the sharing rule is known prior to
the decisions made by the bureaus e.g due to earlier experiences.
8  The time additive utility function
for bureau i is assumed to be of the following type;
12
ii i VH H δ =+      (3)
where 
i V  is utility of bureau i, δ  is the discount factor where 01 δ <≤ , while  1
i H and 2
i H  are health
care production for bureau i in period 1 and period 2, respectively.
 9  It follows from (3) that neither
bureau activity (size) nor bureaucratic slack appear as independent arguments in the bureau utility
function (see e.g. Niskanen (1971) and Moene (1986)).  By using (1) , (2) and (3), the maximisation
problem of bureau i can be presented as follows;
() 12 x( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
i
ii i i i i
d
Ma V F b d F b d ad D a n rD δ  =+ + − + + −             i = 1…..n                  (4)
where  
i
j b  is the (planned) budget for bureau i in period j and where we have utilised that  11
iii Rbd =+
and  22
iii i Rbds =−+ .
Each bureau is now assumed to employ a Nash strategy, which implies that each player, when
determining it’s deficit, takes all other players’ deficits as given. Now, maximising (4) w.r.t. 
i d  , we
arrive at the following optimality conditions given interior solutions;
10
,
12 () 1 ()
1( ) 0
im r i i
ii i




∂∂ − ∂  =− − + =  ∂∂ ∂ 
                 i =1….n      (5)
which determines the optimal budget deficit for bureau i. It follows from (5) that the marginal increase
in health production from additional resources in period 1 is to be balanced against the discounted
marginal production loss following from less resources being available in following period. The term
in parenthesis determines the marginal net loss in available period 2 resources and depends upon  , ar
                                                
8A simple stochastic formulation would be to introduce probabilities for sponsor compensation and absent
compensation. However, the case with complete bureau accountability (absent compensation) can still be
analysed within our framework by setting r = 0.
9 Throughout the paper we keep the discount factors equal across bureaus.
10 An interior solution is reached by assuming that the health production function is essential in resource
spending.8
and n and equals (1-r) for a= 1 (relative deficit) while it equals (1-r/n) for  0 a =  (the egalitarian
rule).
The second order condition for the problem described in (4) is;
2 2, 2 2
12 () 1 ()
1( ) 0
im r i i
ii ii ii
VF R a F R
ra
dd dd n dd
δ
∂∂ − ∂  =− − + <  ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ 
            i =1.…n      (6)
which is fulfilled given our former assumption about the health production function.
In the following we will consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium which implies that all bureaus have
identical budgets in each period; 
11
11 ...
n bb b == = and 
12
22 .. .
n bb b == = The symmetric equilibrium
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    (7)
The expression on the left side is the marginal technical rate of substitution (
1,2
mr MS ) between the two
periods, while the constant 
mr Q  is the discounted net marginal loss of resources in the final period
which is positive and less or equal to 1. Not surprisingly it follows from (7) the size of r has an
positive impact on the equilibrium value. A higher value of r, ceteris paribus, lowers both the
denominator on the left hand and 
mr Q , consequently d must be higher. The higher the share of global
deficits that is being compensated by the sponsor, r, the higher the deficit for the representative
bureau. Thus limited liability acts as an incentive for bureaus to overspend budgets.
The same expression (see 7) can also be applied to analyse the situation with complete bureau liability
in that the sponsor does not bailout for any positive deficit. By assuming no discounting, δ  = 1, and
hard budget constraints ( 0 r = ), 
mr Q  equals 1 (see 7), and the following condition now describes the











It follows from (8) that a necessary condition for a positive deficit to occur for a representative bureau
is that the (planned) budget in period 2 is higher than the period 1 budget. The optimal resource9
allocation is to share the expected budget increase equally across both periods given absent
discounting.  Consequently a balanced budgeting in this perspective turns out to be inflexible even for
a situation where extra grants from the sponsor are not provided in response to budget deficits.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the higher the degree of bureau impatience (lower δ )
the stronger the incentives to overspend budgets. A δ <1 implies a positive deficit even for the case
where 
21 bb = . A future technology improvement (a time invariant production technology) will induce
an effect opposite of higher discounting creating an incentive for period 1 saving (disincentive for
overspending budgets). Hence, we have identified four separate incentives for optimal budget deficits;
time discounting, expectations about future budget increases, changes in technology over time, as well
as soft budget constraints.
Now, we return to the case with soft budget constraints (limited bureau liability) where sponsor
compensation is assumed to be provided with certainty (r > 0). Now, by letting  0 a =  and  1 a = , the













r d MS Q




 ∂ ≡= − ≡  ∂−− 
∂


















∂ ≡= − ≡
∂−−
∂
   (10)
It is observed from (9) that the number of bureaus has an impact on the equilibrium value for the
egalitarian sharing rule ( 1 a = ), since 
e Q  increase with n, thus inducing a lower deficit in equilibrium
for each bureau. However, the overall effect from a change in the number of bureaus on the global
deficit remains indeterminate since two opposing effects are at work for this sharing rule. First, each
“incumbent” bureau prefers a lower deficit for a higher number of bureaus. Second, an extra bureau,
ceteris paribus, represents an addition to the global deficit. From (10) it follows that the optimal
bureau deficit remains independent of the number of bureaus for sharing based upon relative deficit.
An additional bureau does not influence the strategic behaviour of other bureaus, consequently the
global equilibrium deficit increases with the number of bureaus. This result may appear somewhat
surprising but is a direct consequence of the public good effect and the negative externality effect
cancelling each other out for this sharing rule. Each bureau can be said to undertake budget decisions10
independently of each other.
11 In contrast to the case of sharing based upon relative deficit, a free-rider
effect is introduced for egalitarian sharing, in that each bureau does not keep the entire increment of
their own effort. Finally, by comparing the equilibrium levels for the two sharing rules in (9) and (10)
it follows that  1
rd e rd e dd f o r n DD >> ⇒ > . Thus, substantial gains, in terms of a lower
symmetric global deficit equilibrium, can be reached if the sponsor is able to pre-commit to an
egalitarian sharing rule rather than the one based on relative deficit.
12
A possible sponsor reform could be to change the number of bureaus in the sector while keeping the
global budget constant (concentration or fragmentation). To analyse the marginal effect from such a
structural reform, assume that the budgets in both periods are equal, 
12 bbb == , which implies that







































It follows from (11) and (12) that both expressions remain indeterminate since the cross partial
derivative of the utility function, V, is not signed. If the cross partial derivative is assumed negative,
then the global deficit equilibrium value for sharing based upon relative deficit will increase with the
number of bureaus (see 11). The same condition, however, is not sufficient to reach the same
conclusion for the egalitarian sharing rule (se 12). Here an additional negative effect is identified by
the third term which captures the free-rider effect which is absent for relative deficit sharing.
Determinate conclusions may however be reached by assuming a logarithmic production technology.
Given such an assumption the symmetric equilibrium values for the mixed distribution rule;
()
()
1( 1 ) 1
11( 1 ) 1
mr bb r n a n
d
rr n a n
δ
δ
−− − +   =
−+ − − +  
                      (13)
                                                
11 This finding follows from the fact that the compensation function is linear.
12 This conclusion implicitly assumes a sponsor welfare function decreasing with the size of the global deficit
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   (14)
where (13) describes the deficit for a representative bureau and (14) the global deficit. By using the
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   (16)
It is observed from (15) that an increasing number of bureaus (for a fixed global budget) with
necessity will lower the global deficit in equilibrium given egalitarian sharing. The free-rider effect
can now be said to be dominating. From (16) it follows that the symmetric global equilibrium, for
sharing based upon relative deficits, remains unaffected by sector fragmentation. Thus, the increase in
the global deficit that follows from an additional bureau is exactly offset by the contradicting effect
that follows from lower budgets to all “incumbent” bureaus.
3. EQUILIBRIA WHEN BUREAUS ARE HETEROGENEOUS.
In this section we focus at the role of heterogeneity by considering two bureaus that differ in size;
12
ii bb >  i =1,2. First, we reconsider the two sharing rules already analysed in section 2 (rd and e), now
under asymmetry, thereafter, two additional sharing rules are introduced; i) sharing based upon
relative size (rb) and ii) sharing that equalizes ex-post debt-budget ratios across bureaus (dar). It is
also assumed that each firm has the same budget in both periods , 
12
1 1, 2, ii bbbi == =  which again
implies that  12 1 2 BBbbB == + ≡
3.1. The egalitarian distribution rule.
By following the same procedures as in the preceding section, the Nash equilibria for egalitarian
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It follows from both equilibrium conditions that the marginal technical rate of substitution,  ,
j
i MS for
each bureau is to be the same for each sharing rule, since the discounted marginal net loss is the same
for both bureaus. It is also observed that the 
j
i MS  in optimum is to be lowest for the egalitarian
sharing rule, 
,, ae ar d
ii MS MS < , which again produces the following result;
,, ar d ae
ii dd >  i =1, 2.  ⇒   
,, ar d ae DD > (19)
The optimal bureau deficit in equilibrium is higher for sharing based upon relative deficit relative to
egalitarian sharing rule for the same budget. This conclusion confirms the result already arrived at in
section 3.1 for the symmetric case.  It is, however, not possible to arrive at determinate conclusions as
concerns the relationship between budget size and deficit within each sharing rule. The bureau being
largest in size will not with necessity, induce the largest deficit in equilibrium.
3.2. Sharing based on relative size (rb).
A third sharing rule will now be introduced. In particular, we are interested in the consequences from
sharing rules that distribute bailouts across bureaus according to the same criteria that governed the
allocation of (planned) budgets in the first place.
13 Hence, we are concerned with the case for which
extra grants are divided across bureaus according to relative activity (or size). The compensation




ii s rD where b B i γγ == =   (20)
where 
1
i b and 
1 B still denote the budget in period 1 for bureau i and the global budget in the same
period. As observed from (20), relative size is measured by the ratio of the initial budget of bureau i to
the global budget in the same period.
                                                
13 Until 1997 the allocation of the global hospital budget (block grants) across hospitals in Norway was mainly
based upon objective criteria such as demographic factors.13
By following the same procedures as above, and keeping the assumption of the budget being constant
across the two periods,  the following expression for the global deficit in equilibrium for this sharing
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The marginal technical rate of substitution in optimum now differs across the two bureaus since the
discounted marginal net loss differs across the two bureaus since  12 γγ > . Furthermore, it is observed
that the difference increases with the degree of heterogeneity (γ ). As a consequence, the effects on
the equilibria from bureau size asymmetry, are more complex than was the case for the first two
sharing rules considered.  Now, let 
1 1 γ =  and 
1 0,5 γ = , which yield two special cases for sharing
based upon relative size. For
1 1 γ = , the optimality condition in (21) coincides with the one that
matters for sharing based upon relative deficit (see 18). This result arises because 
1 1 γ = implies a
model with a single bureau, and sharing based upon relative size for one single bureau is in effect
sharing based upon relative deficits. For 
1 0.5 γ = , the conditions (see 21) coincide with the one that
matters for the symmetric game given egalitarian sharing. Sharing based on relative size, given two
bureaus of equal size, represents an egalitarian sharing rule.
It is not possible to identify a unique relationship between bureau size and the equilibrium deficit for
this particular sharing rule, in addition it follows that 
rb D can be higher than, equal to, or less than
, ae D  and 
, ar d D .14
3.3. Sharing that equalizes debt-activity ratios (dar).
Notions of fairness may be decisive for the actual sharing rule chosen, and those sharing rules already
considered may yield outcomes that are inconsistent with such preferences. Consider for example the
situation with an egalitarian sharing rule and a logarithmic production function, two bureaus, a global
budget amounting to 100 and no discounting ( 1 δ = ). If one bureau controls 90% of the global
(planned) budget and the sponsor is believed to cover 40% of the global deficit ( 0,4 r = ), it follows that
the equilibrium deficits for the two bureaus become 11,6 and 2,7. Assume that the sponsor is
concerned with the relative performance of bureaus w.r.t remaining debt relatively to the activity level
of the bureau,  defined as follows, 
1 () /
ii i i dsb λ = − . By inserting the equilibrium outcomes for each
bureau into
i λ  it follows that the largest bureau will end up with an ex-post debt-activity ratio, 
, ie λ , in
equilibrium equal to 7,7% while for the smallest bureau the same ratio, 
, je λ , equals 16,2%. In this
perspective, the equilibrium outcomes need not provide a fair allocation of ”burdens” across bureaus.
Sponsors being concerned with notions of fairness of this type may wish to apply sharing rules that
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14 The second order condition for this problem is 
21
11 1 (1 ) 1 ( )/ 0 bb r B δ  − + −− <  .15
As was the case for sharing based upon size the marginal technical rate of substitution in optimum will
differ across the two bureaus. However, it is not possible to arrive at determinant conclusions as
concerns the relationship between bureau size and deficit and to rank the global equilibrium deficit
relative to the same deficit for the three sharing rules already presented.
3.4. A comparison of sharing rules
In the following we will discuss and compare the four sharing rules for a logarithmic specification of
the health production function. In addition the discount factor for both bureaus are set equal to 1. The
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From (26) and (27), the former conclusion, 
,, ar d ae DD > , is being confirmed;. Secondly, it follows
from comparing (26) and (29) that 
, dar a rd DD > , saying that a sharing rule that aims to equalise
relative ex-post debt burdens across bureaus yields a global deficit being higher than the same deficit
for sharing based upon relative deficits (rd). The only remaining deficit to determine, in order to arrive
at a complete ranking, is the one for sharing based on relative size (rb). By inserting for 
1 1 γ = (or
1 0 γ = ) and 
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where we have utilised that γ 1=1  ⇒
1 bB = . As already shown, the global equilibrium deficit is
always higher for a sharing rule based on relative deficit (rd) than the egalitarian one (e), thus the
                                                
15 In (28) we have utilised that  21 1 γγ =− .16
global deficit for sharing based upon relative size is higher for  1 γ =1 relative to  1 γ = 0.5. 
rb D  in (28)
reaches its minimum value when bureaus are of equal size ( 1 γ = 0.5). Since (28) is monotonically
increasing for increasing values of 
1 γ  given that  1 γ ≥ 0.5, the global equilibrium deficit must be
increasing with the degree of bureau size asymmetry. An increasing degree of asymmetry can be said
to strengthen the overall incentives for using deficit as a strategic appropriative device when sharing is
based upon relative size. The reason is that a more skewed distribution with respect to size can be said
to internalise externalities to an increasing degree.
We can now summarise our findings above with the following ranking of the four equilibria;
 
,, dar a rd rb a e DDD D >> >   (32)
The incentives for strategic behaviour are especially significant for sharing based upon ex-post relative
debt “burdens” (dar). To understand the forces at play, assume that ex-post debt–activity ratios are
equal for two bureaus. If bureau i now increases it’s own budget deficit, it follows from (22) that
,, id a r jd a r λλ > .  For a given global compensation, the sponsor must now transfer funds from bureau j
to i in order to balance the ratios. Consequently, a bureau can raise own compensation in two ways.
First because a higher bureau deficit raise global deficits and secondly because the same increase (for
a given global compensation) implies a redistribution of funds away from rivals being proportional to
the budget size of the rival (see 23). A sharing rule based upon relative budgets (rb) represents an
intermediate case with an equilibrium being lower than sharing based upon relative deficit (rd) but
higher compared to the egalitarian sharing rule (e). However the actual equilibrium outcome may be
close to both 
, ar d D  and 
, ae D  depending on the degree of bureau size asymmetry.
A feature that separates the four sharing rules is the marginal effect on own compensation in response
to the deficit decision of other bureaus. For sharing based upon relative deficits the cross partial
derivate is zero; 
, /0
ir d j sd ∂∂ = , while for an egalitarian sharing rule (e) and for sharing based upon
relative budget (rb) the same effect equals  / rn and 
ir γ , respectively. For the last sharing rule, ex-
post debt-activity ratios, the cross partial derivative equals 
, // ( 1 ) 0
id a r j i sd b B r ∂∂ = −− <  which
reflects two opposing effects. First, a higher rival deficit generates a reduction in own compensation
being proportional to own budget size. Second, there is a positive effect following from own
compensation rising with a higher global deficit. Since the expression is negative, the first effect
(negative externality) always dominates the positive second effect. The sign of cross partial derivatives
is also decisive for the strategic properties of the decision variables of our models. For sharing based17
upon relative deficits (rd) they become independent, for egalitarian sharing (e) and sharing based upon
relative budgets (rb) they become strategic complements since an increase in a rival’s decision
variable (deficit) strengthens own incentives to raise the deficit (see Bulow et al., 1985). For the last
sharing rule (dar), on the other hand, they are strategic substitutes.
An additional property distinguishing the four rules is that each bureau’s share is independent of own
effort (exogenous) for sharing based upon relative budgets (rb) and egalitarian sharing (e), while being
endogenous for the last two rules considered (rd and dar). Finally, the four sharing rules differ with
respect to what extent they equalise ex-post “burdens” across bureaus. Our numerical examples have
made clear that in equilibrium both egalitarian sharing (e) and sharing based on relative budgets (rb)
generate ratios that differ across bureaus. For sharing aimed at equalising ex-post debt–activity ratios
the conclusion is obvious. The situation for sharing based upon relative deficit (rd) can be derived by
inserting the associated equilibrium values for each bureau into (22) which yields the following
expression; 
,, /2
ir d jr d r λλ ==. Hence, in equilibrium for this sharing rule (rd), the relative ex-post
“burdens” become equal for the participating bureaus.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper is inspired by observations of recurrent budget deficits and subsequent sponsor bailouts in
the public hospital sector, which suggest that budget overspending may be motivated by strategic
behaviour. The paper is framed into an institutional setting of multiple bureaus being financed by a
common non-strategic sponsor who allocates extra funds after observing the overall deficit in this
sector. This framework is then applied to investigate how various sharing rules may influence bureau
incentives to behave strategically. The model has some similarities with the rent-seeking literature for
which economic agents invest resources in order to increase their probability of appropriating some
surplus. One example is the simple and influential model first suggested by Tullock (1980), where
several agents compete for a given prize and where the probability of winning the prize increases with
own efforts and decrease with the efforts of rivals. In our model, bureaus compete for a share of the
prize (extra funds) and the rent-seeking activity is the overspending of budgets. Now, rent-seeking
activities do not represent a pure social waste since the activity itself adds to social production. The
model also differs from Tullock games in that the rent (extra funds) is determined endogenously, being
a function of the sum of bureau deficits. Consequently, the aggregate prize sought by a group of agents
has public good characteristics. Furthermore, the contest is not a probabilistic one over an indivisible
object but a deterministic one for shares of the prize.18
The paper shows that balanced budgeting need not to be an optimal way for bureaus to allocate
resources even when sponsors are not bailing-out. Furthermore, the equilibrium values of the global
deficit is found to differ across sharing rules. As a consequence, our analysis suggest the existence of
considerable sponsor gains, in terms of lower equilibrium deficits, by a careful selection of distribution
rules. However, pre-commitment to particular sharing rules may be difficult for the same reasons that
make sponsors unable to pre-commit to (planned) budgets. If, however, the political costs associated
with sticking to particular sharing rules are moderate, it may be possible for the sponsor to increase the
share of the global budget deficit that determines extra funds and on the same time reduce the size of
extra funds. In this perspective, the choice of sharing rules may be a possible device to weaken the
long-term incentives for strategic behaviour. Future works could extend our model in several respects
for example by analysing the role of uncertainty with respect to sponsor bailouts or by introducing
some kind of welfare criterion together with strategic sponsor behaviour.
The public hospital sector in Norway consists of about 75 hospitals and there exist an hierarchy with
three levels reflecting different degrees of specialisation (local hospitals, the counties main hospitals
and five regional hospitals). Hagen (1996) finds that hospital size increase with degree of
specialisation in a systematic way and size ranges from 1.500 to 70.000 inpatients annually.
16 As
concerns the actual sharing rules applied for the Norwegian hospital sector not much evidence is
available. In principle, sharing rules are decided upon annually, either on the basis of signals given by
the government or Parliament commitees, or left to the Ministry of Health.
17 Anecdotal evidence and
personal communication, however, suggest a shift over time, from sharing based upon relative deficits
to sharing based upon relative budgets (size). In spite of some disparities between our model and the
institutional environment of the Norwegian hospital sector, the conclusions of this study suggest that
this change may have weakened the rationale for strategic overspending of budgets. However, the
asymmetry in hospital size being observed for this sector suggests that the incentives need not be
significantly reduced. If so, pre-commitment to an egalitarian sharing for all hospitals or, perhaps
more realistically, for hospitals at each degree of specialization, most likely would have a strong
negative impact on strategic behavior of this type.
                                                
16 The correlation coefficient between Norwegian hospital types and size is 0.86 (Hagen, 1996).
17 The actual criterias applied for the distribution of extra funds over counties and hospital may change from year
to year.19
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